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Abstract— Ubiquitous computing aims to enhance computer
use by utilizing many computer resources available through
physical environments, but also making them invisible to users.
The purpose of ubiquitous computing is anywhere and anytime
access to information within computing infrastructures that is
blended into a background and no longer be reminded. This
ubiquitous computing poses new security challenges while the
information can be accessed at anywhere and anytime because it
may be applied by criminal users. The information may contain
private information that cannot be shared by all user commu-
nities. Several approaches are designed to protect information
for pervasive environments. However, ad-hoc mechanisms or
protocols are typically added in the approaches by compromising
disorganized policies or additional components to protect from
unauthorized access.
Usage control has been considered as the next generation
access control model with distinguishing properties of decision
continuity. In this paper, we present a usage control model to pro-
tect services and devices in ubiquitous computing environments,
which allows the access restrictions directly on services and object
documents. The model not only supports complex constraints for
pervasive computing, such as services, devices and data types
but also provides a mechanism to build rich reuse relationships
between models and objects. Finally, comparisons with related
works are analysed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ubiquitous computing is a broad semantic definition. In
many cases, researchers define ubiquitous computing in their
research projects through examples. We use Weisers definition
of ubiquitous computing [1], that is, ubiquitous computing
is the method of enhancing computer use by making many
computers available throughout the physical environment, but
making them effectively invisible to the user.
The main future of ubiquitous computing is to create a
user centric and application oriented computing environment.
Such environments are different from the traditional comput-
ing models since a physical space within the environments
supported by associated hardware and software facilitates
interactive information exchange between users and the space.
The availability of cheap computing devices and wireless
networks are making such spaces possible. A user does not
require to log into a single personal computer as in traditional
computing environments, but communicates with a variety
of computing devices in the space. Scalable configuration is
an important aspect in such space since the same space is
often used for different tasks at different times. Contextual
information, such as the current users in the space, or the
current activity, is important for the configuration.
The widely use of advanced technology in computing,
network and sensor has facilitated the development of ubiq-
uitous computing, enabling various convenient applications.
Resources and information in ubiquitous computing environ-
ments are shared by users, heterogeneous sensors and so on.
Security issues are vital in the environments since contextual
information such as sensor locations and applications become
an integral part of the system authorization. On the other
hand, a variety of applications and users interaction with
the pervasive environment poses new security challenges to
the traditional user-password approach for computer security.
The heterogeneous devices and mobile users in such dynamic
pervasive computing environments make security management
difficult, especially the access to authorized users since it is
a basic security requirement for guaranteeing user’s privacy,
information confidentiality, integrity and availability.
The security architecture of ubiquitous computing and its
applications are in infant stage, but an active research area
[2], [3], [4]. Several papers have analysed the security re-
quirements for ubiquitous computing [5], [6], [4], [7]. An
active space is proposed in [5] which can be configured for
different types of applications at different times. Role-based
access control [8] techniques for easy administration of users
and permissions are applied to create and enforce access
control policies for different configurations of the active space.
Through an example scenario, dynamic protection domains are
built for the assignments of permissions to roles and roles to
users based on context information. A security architecture
is designed for a research project GAIA operation system
[6]. The architecture provides dynamism and flexibility to
manage the security concerns in such a computing system
with physical spaces of hundreds of computational devices
extending the user’s view of the computational environment
beyond the physical limitations of a traditional distributed
system. A protocol is presented in [7] which preserves the
privacy of users and keeps their communication anonymous.
In this protocol, a ”MIST” is created that can protect user’s ID
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from the system and other users and users are able to enjoy
seamless interaction with services and other entities within the
ubiquitous computing environment.
An application of payment prototype in ubiquitous com-
puting is analysed in [4]. Computational models of trust
are proposed for use in pervaive environments for deciding
whether or not customers are allowed to pay with an e-purse.
Authors have built a scheme (and its prototype) that mitigates
this kind of loss of privacy without forbidding the use of trust
for smoothing payment by giving the opportunity to the user
to divide trust (i.e. transactions) according to context.
There are several security issues that need to be addressed
in the application of ubiquitous computing. In particular, the
following requirements are critical to developing a secure and
flexible access control architecture.
1) Access based on contextual information.
Existing access approaches are developed in the context
of traditional distributed and multi-user systems which
specify the allowed accesses for users or subjects to
resources or objects. The users and objects in traditional
systems are static, but in ubiquitous environments both
subjects and objects may enter and leave the space
dynamically. There is no mechanism for expressing
other factors that may influence authorization.
2) Access for different users and devices. Ubiquitous com-
puting may also be used for non-technical applications.
Users in the pervasive environment may not have any
special training and prefer the easy use of the devices
in the environments.
3) Access control in a collaborative environment. Ubiqui-
tous computing is often used for collaborative services,
where many users work together to complete a task [9].
An access control model in ubiquitous environments has
to provide a secure collaboration structure for the users
sharing of permissions in the collaborative task between
dynamic users.
4) Decentralized administration. A physical space in ubiq-
uitous computing is usually part of a larger system,
and the access control policy may be organized by the
administrators of the larger systems and the space.
The second requirement is about human computer inter-
face which is beyond this paper. We focus the remaining
three requirements. This paper presents authorization models
which adopt usage control to manage access to the space
and secure architectures to perform the authorization models.
Traditional access control has analyzed authorization decisions
on a subject’s access to target resources. “Obligations” are
requirements that have to be followed by the subject for
allowing accessing resources. “Conditions” are subject and
object independent requirements that have to be passed. In
ubiquitous environments, both users and objects are highly
dynamic, obligations and conditions of new hosts are decision
factors for the access management.
Traditional authorization decisions are generally made at
the time of requests but do not consider ongoing controls for
long access or for revocation. The objects including devices
in pervasive computing space are used by various users. There
are complex relationships among users, objects, and arbitrary
authorizations between users and objects. An object can be
a device, a file, dynamically generated documents, and so
on. Because of the complex ubiquitous environment, users
are required to obey obligations and satisfy conditions and
ongoing control with different security policies. Usage control
[10] has been recognized as the next generation access control
to be efficient in security administration. Authorizations, obli-
gations and conditions are used to build a secure architecture.
The ongoing control provides dynamic access verification for
contextual information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 presents usage control and ubiquitous computing model
including the relationships between space objects and users,
and space objects and applications. Three decision factors Au-
thorization, Obligation, Conditions and Continuity properties
pre and ongoing are introduced in this section. Section 3
develops authorization models with usage control for ubiq-
uitous computing. It includes pre-Authorizations, ongoing-
Authorizations, pre-Obligations, ongoing-Obligations,
pre-Conditions and ongoing-Conditions. Section 4 discusses
how to build secure architectures for collaborations in dis-
tributed administration by using reference monitors in details.
Section 5 compares our work with the previous work on
pervasive computing security. The difference between this
work from others is presented. Section 6 concludes the paper
and outlines our future work.
II. RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
A. Usage control
Usage control is used for the access control in the pervasive
environment. There are eight components: subjects, subject
attributes, objects, object attributes, rights, authorizations, obli-
gations, and conditions in usage control model [10] (see
Figure 1). Subjects and objects are familiar concepts from
the traditional access control, and are used in their familiar
sense in this paper. A right represents access of a subject to
an object, such as read or write. The existence of the right
is determined when the access is attempted by the subject.
The usage decision functions indicated in Figure 1 make this
determination based on subject attributes, object attributes,
authorizations, obligations and conditions at the time of usage
requests.
Subject and object attributes can be used during the access
decision process. Examples of subject attributes are identities,
group names, roles, memberships, credits, etc. Examples of
object attributes are security labels, ownerships, classes, access
control lists, etc. In an on-line shop a price could be an object
attribute, for instance, the book Harry Potter is priced at $20
for a read right and priced at $1000 price for a resell right.
Authorizations, obligations and conditions are decision fac-
tors used by decision functions to determine whether a subject
should be allowed to access an object. Authorizations are
based on subject and object attributes and the specific right.
Authorization is usually required prior to the access, but in
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Fig. 1. Components of Model
addition it is possible to require ongoing authorization during
the access, e.g., a certificate revocation list (CRL) may be
periodically checked while the access is in progress. An access
is immediately revoked if the relevant certificate appears on
the CRL. Authorizations may require updates on subject and
object attributes. These updates can be either ‘pre’, ‘ongoing’,
or ‘post’ that are called continuity properties shown in Figure
2.
For example, pre-paid mobile phone requires update of the
subjects (users) clearance prior to access and also requires
periodic updates of the remaining credits while usage is
in progress, with possible termination in case of overuse.
Fixed phone payment system requires updates after the usage
has ended to calculate current usage time. Obligations are
requirements that a subject must perform before (pre) or
during (ongoing) access. An example of a pre-obligation is
the requirement that a user must provide some contact and
personal information before accessing IEEE digital library.
The requirement that a user has to keep certain advertising
windows open while he is accessing some service, is an
example of an ongoing obligation. Subject and object attributes
can be used to decide what kind of obligations are required
for access approval.
Conditions are decision factors that depend on environ-
mental and system-oriented requirements. For example, IEEE
member can access full papers in the IEEE digital library.
Conditions can also include the security status of the system,
such as low level, normal, high alert, etc.
As discussed above, continuity is another decision factor as
shown in Figure 2. In traditional access control, authorization
is assumed to be done before access is allowed (pre). However,
the dynamic changes of contextual information in ubiquitous
computing environments, it is quite reasonable to extend this
for continuous enforcement by evaluating usage requirements
throughout usages (ongoing).
B. Ubiquitous computing model
The basic concept in usage control is the access right to
an object, which is called usage. Users are assigned usage
when they enter a special space of ubiquitous computing
environments, and access policies for services in the space
are generated by assigning access rights to users. The objects
in pervasive environments are services, devices, dynamic gen-
erated objects. The access rights, for example, to a device are
the set of operations that can be performed by users and to a
service are the set of operations that can be applied by users.
We introduce the concept of a space object, with associated
space rights, which are permissions to resources within the
space. Access control policies for the space are described by
space objects and rights, and this simplifies the task of the
space administrator. The main future of ubiquitous computing
is to create a user centric and application oriented computing
environment. Therefore, we consider users and applications
in this pervasive environments. Users who want to access the
space have their accounts created by system administrators and
are assigned a usage of access space objects based on their
rights and responsibilities within the space. When a user with
a usage enters to a space, the user is automatically assigned
a space object, which is restricted to a set of rights that make
sense within the space. Figure 3 shows how users are assigned
to space usages.
For instance, a space administrator could create a usage
of interview-room that is allowed to setup the space as an
interview room, and decide that only users of human resource
offices could be assigned this usage. An officer in human
resource may have many other permissions in the entire
system, but when the office is assigned into the usage of
interview-room, it is only allowed rights related to that task.
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A user’s rights in a space are a subset of his rights within the
entire system, it means that rights assigned to a space object
are always a part of rights to the corresponding system.
Application usages are used to specify access control poli-
cies for applications. These application usages are mapped
into space usages by the space administrator. For example, as
shown in Figure 4, an application for an interview may have
two application usages: committee members and candidates.
These two usages are decided with the functions of different
participants in the application. Candidates should access to
a presentation device and committee members must have
read access to the slides presented. The specific rights that
a candidate requires depends on the devices in the space
that are running the application. Application usages and users
are assigned by the space administrator to appropriate space
objects and their access rights, and access control within a
space is only enforced in terms of these space usages.
The protection domains in our model are defined by au-
thorization approaches in the space. When the space switches
modes, new objects may be dynamically created, based on
the context of the space, and rights automatically assigned to
them.
III. AUTHORIZATION MODELS
We now discuss authorization models for space objects
adopting usage control in this section. Based on three decision
factors: authorizations, obligations, and conditions, we develop
a family of core models for usage control. By core models, we
mean that they focus on the enforcement process and do not
include administrative issues. We assume there exists a usage
request on space object. Decision-making can be done either
before (pre) or during (ongoing) exercise of the requested
right. Decision-making after the usage has no influence on the
decision of current usage. Based on these criteria, we have 6
possible cases as a core model for usage control in the space:
pre-Authorizations, ongoing-Authorizations, pre-Obligations,
ongoing-Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-Conditions.
Depending on the access requirements on pervasive computing
environments in real world, it is possible to utilize more than
one case.
For simplicity we consider only the pure cases consisting
of Authorizations, Obligations or Conditions alone with pre
or ongoing decisions only. We focus on developing compre-
hensive usage control models for the space objects. Next we
present usage control models (UCM) with different pure cases.
A. :pre-Authorizations Model
In an model, the decision process is performed
before access is allowed. The model has the
following components:
1) ,
and usage decision Boolean functions
on for and , respectively.
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Fig. 4. Application - space usage assignments
Where represent Subject,
Space object, Application in a pervasive comput-
ing environment and Rights required on the object
and on the application (e.g. read, write) respectively.
represent attributes
of subjects, objects and applications in the environments
respectively. and are predicates about au-
thorization functions. Fox example, when users enter the
space, , or is a function on users’ account
and password (subject attributes) or service tickets ,
objects and rights (read, write or resell) that are used
to check whether users can access the objects with the
rights or not,
2)
,
Where means is a necessary condition for .
This predicate indicates that if subject is allowed to
access object with right then the indicated
condition must be true.
3)
.
The predicate indi-
cates that if application is allowed to map a space
object with right then the decision function
is true.
The model provides an authorization method
on whether a subject can access an object or not, and
whether an application can map to an object or not. The
predicate shows that subject can
access some part of information in the space. At this stage,
private information in the ubiquitous computing environments
is restricted.
B. :ongoing-Authorizations Model
An model is used to check ongoing authoriza-
tions during access processes. The model has the
following components:
1)
as before, and ongoing usage decision func-
tions on (Space object) and on both
and ,
is used to check whether can continue to access
the object or not, and is to check whether
can continue to map the object or not.
2) ,
This is a prerequisite for ongoing authorization on .
3) ,
This is a prerequisite for ongoing authorization on .
4)
,
The access of subject to is terminated if the
ongoing authorization is failed.
5)
.
The map of to is terminated if the ongoing
authorization is failed.
introduces the onA, predicate
instead of preA, . and
are required to be true,
otherwise ongoing authorization should not be initiated.
Ongoing authorization is active throughout the usage of
the requested right, and the and predicates are
repeatedly checked for continuation access. These checks are
performed periodically based on time or event. The model does
not specify exactly how this should be done. When attributes
are changed and requirements are no longer satisfied,
procedures are performed. We use and
to indicate that rights
of subject on object and of application
are revoked and the ongoing access terminated. For example,
suppose only one candidate can access the presentation
device in an interview room simultaneously. If another person
requests access and passed the pre-authorization, the user
with the earlier time access is terminated. While this is a case
of ongoing authorizations, it is important that the certificate
should be evaluated in a decision.
C. :pre-Obligations Model
introduces pre-obligations that have to be ful-
filled before access is permitted. Examples of pre-obligations
are requiring a student to register by filling forms before
accessing an education website, requiring the student to click
the ACCEPT box on a license agreement to run some software
such as and “ ”, etc. The
pre-obligation action may perform on a different object (e.g.,
register, license agreement) than the object that the user is
trying to access (e.g., Slide-show). It means that the pre-
obligation action may be done by some other subject. Hence
obligation subjects, objects, and actions are added in the
following model.
For simplicity, the following model is described for subject
and object only. It can directly be used for any part of restricted
information in the space.
The model has the following components:
1) as before,
2) and represent obligation subjects,
objects, and actions, respectively; decision function
,
As mentioned above, subject and access object may
be different from and , hence, we separately
describe them. The function is
used to check if obligations are obeyed or not.
3)
.
The function must be true
if is allowed to access with right .
The model indicates that obligations have to be fulfilled
before can access . Note that each obligation has to be
true if there are more than two obligations.
D. : ongoing-Obligations Model
Obligations are required to fulfill in models
while rights are exercised. Ongoing-obligations may have to
be fulfilled periodically or continuously. For example, a user
may have to open a security policy window at least every 30
minutes. Alternatively, a user may have to leave the window
active all the time with inconvenience. The model concerns
obligations that have to be fulfilled.
The model has the following components:
1) as before,
2) and represent obligation subjects,
objects, and actions, respectively; an ongoing decision
function
,
The ongoing function is
used to check if obligations are continually obeyed or
not.
3) ,
A prerequisite for . It means is accessing
.
4)
.
Where indicates that the access of
on with is revoked if the ongoing obligations
are failed.
E. : pre-Conditions Model
As described earlier, conditions are not directly related
to subjects and objects since they define environmental and
system restrictions. We focus on this model for subject and
space object. The model can also be used for restricted device
in the space.
The model has the following components:
1) as before,
2) (a set of pre-conditions), verify conditions
function
. The
function is used to check whether
the pre-conditions are satisfied or not.
3)
.
All pre-conditions have to be checked if there are more
than two conditions.
4) .
The third component indicates situations with more than
two conditions and the expresses that
all conditions have to be satisfied before access is approved.
F. : ongoing-Conditions Model
model requires conditions to be satisfied while
rights are in active use. For example, realOne player does not
work when Windows XP system works on safety module.
The model has the following components:
1) as before,
2) (a set of ongoing conditions), verify ongoing
conditions function
,
The function is used to check whether
ongoing conditions are satisfied or not.
3)
,
All ongoing conditions are required to check.
4) ,
A prerequisite for .
5) .
indicates that the access of on
is stopped if ongoing conditions are not satisfied. In
practice, the above six models may need to be combined
for an access control. The following algorithm is based on
these models and introduces how to manage an ubiquitous
computing access control when a user (subject) applies to
access an object (Obj) with right .
Authorization Algorithm:
Input: Access request: (S, ObjR, Obj)
Output: result.xml
Method:
// Verify UCM preA:
1) if
// The process in pre-Authorization is not successful
2) ACCESS denied;
3) endif
// Verify UCM onA:
4) if
// The process in pre-Authorization is failed, do not need further
verification.
5) Application denied;
6) endif
7)
// The process in ongoing-Authorization is not successful
8) ACCESS stopped;
// Verify UCM preB:
9) if
// Obligations are not fulfilled and pre-Obligation is not passed.
10) ACCESS denied;
11) endif
//Verify UCM onB:
12) if
13) Stop verification.
14) endif
15) if
// Obligations are not continually fulfilled and on-Obligation is not
passed.
16) ACCESS is stopped;
17) endif
// Verify UCM preC:
18) if
// Conditions are not satisfied and pre-Condition verification is not
passed.
19) ACCESS denied;
20) endif
//Verify UCM onC:
21) if
22) Stop verification.
23) endif
24) if
// Conditions are not continually satisfied and on-Condition is not
passed.
25) ACCESS is stopped;
26) endif
27) ACCESS Obj is permitted;
28) Output result.xml;
Table 1: Authorization algorithm
We obtain an authorization method for users access objects
in the space by checking users’ (subjects’) authorizations,
obligations and conditions with continuity properties. The
algorithm provides a solution of the first requirement. We
analyse security architectures in the next section for the
requirements 3 and 4 in which both client and server sides
is required to be monitored.
IV. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we discuss architecture solutions for ubiq-
uitous computing access control based on reference monitors.
Reference monitors have been discussed extensively in access
control community. Subjects can access objects only through
the reference monitor since it provides control mechanisms on
access space objects such as services and devices in the space.
A. Structure of Reference Monitor
ISO has published a standard for access control framework
by using reference monitors [11]. Based on the standard, a
reference monitor consists of Usage Decision Facility (UDF)
and Usage Enforcement Facility (UEF) as shown in Figure 5.
Each facility includes several functional modules.
UEF includes Customization, Monitor and Update modules
and UDF includes authorization, conditions and obligations
decision modules. When a subject sends an access request
through Customization module to Authorization module, Au-
thorization module verifies authorization process and checks
whether the request is allowed or not. It may return yes or no
or metadata information of the authorization result. This meta-
data information can be used for approved access on objects
by Customization module in UEF. Condition module is used to
make a decision for whether the conditional requirements are
satisfied or not. Obligation module is applied to verify whether
obligations have been performed or not before or during the
requested usage. When any obligation is changed, it must be
monitored by monitor module and the result has to be resolved
by Update module in UEF. Applications of these modules rely
on ubiquitous computing requirements.
B. Architectures
There are two kinds of reference monitors: Server-side
(or Space-side) Reference Monitor (SRM), and Client-side
Reference Monitor (CRM). Servers provide objects such as
services and devices in the space and clients require access
to the objects. Like a traditional reference monitor, an SRM
works in server space environment and manages access to
objects in the space. On the other hand, a CRM works in the
client environment and controls access to the objects when it
works as a server for other clients. For example, the client
acts as a server when a file or a document is delegated or
disseminated to other users. SRM and CRM can coexist within
a system. For real implementations, both CRM and SRM
should be used for better security. We analyse architectures
according to reference monitors on space (server) side only
(SRM-only), on client side only (CRM-only) and on both
server and client sides (SRM & CRM).
SRM-Only Architecture
A system with SRM-only facilitates works on server side only
to control subjects access objects. In this case an object may
or may not be stored in client-side. If the object (e.g. a file)
is allowed to reside in client-side, it means the saved client
copy of the object is no longer valid and doesn’t have to be
controlled. It can be used and changed freely at client-side.
Subjects
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Monitoring
Module
Update
Module Objects
Request  Info Result Info
zation
Module
Condition
Module
Obligation
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Usage Enforcement Facility (UEF)
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zation
Authori−
Space
Fig. 5. Space Access Reference Monitor
For example, a cookie file can be saved at a client’s local
machine for his records and the server doesnt care how the
copy will be used by the client since the system keeps original
account information safe. However if the file or some parts
of the document has to be protected and controlled centrally,
the document must remain at server-side storage and is not
allowed to be stored in client-side. This is the main topics of
traditional access control and trust management system.
CRM-Only Architecture
No reference monitor exists on the server-side in a system with
CRM-only environment. Rather, a reference monitor exists
at the client system for controlling usage of delegated or
disseminated objects. In this environment objects can be stored
either centrally or locally. The usage of the objects saved at
the client-side on behalf of a server is still under the control
of CRM. Distributed ubiquitous computing environments are
associated with certain usage rules and users may need to
prove they have sufficient credentials to access the document.
SRM & CRM Architecture
With both SRM to CRM, this architecture can provide a com-
prehensive access control. SRM may be used for distribution
related control while CRM can be used for object delegation
or dissemination. For instance, in SRM, objects can be pre-
customized for distribution. The pre-customized objects can be
further controlled and customized by CRM. As a result, server
can restrict or eliminate unnecessary exposure of objects that
do not have to be distributed. If a user requests certain object
document that includes some secret information, SRM can
pre-customize the requested objects before distribution such
that the distributed version of the objects doesn’t include any
secret information. If the document cannot be delegated or
disseminated, the CRM at client side can do this work.
The SRM & CRM architecture provides a solution for
restricting access to objects and protecting the objects from
malicious delegation and dissemination in collaborative and
distributed environments.
V. COMPARISONS
Related work has been done on Context-Aware Dynamic
Access Control for Pervasive Applications [3], Role-based
access control in ambient and remote space [12] and Access
Control for Active Spaces [5].
Zhang and Parashar [3] proposed a context-based access
control model for ubiquitous computing through dynamic role-
based access control (DRBAC) model which is an extension
of role-based access control (RBAC). DRBAC borrowed the
definitions of users, roles, permissions and role hierarchy
structure from RBAC, and dynamically adjusts two key re-
quirements based on context information: (1) A users access
privileges must change when the users context changes, and
(2) A resource must adjust its access permission when its
system information changes. The operation of the model
was illustrated using a sample application scenario of smart
building. Compared to traditional access control mechanisms,
the DRBAC model provides improved security for pervasive
applications. Their work is different from ours in two aspects.
First, it focused on the updating of user-role assignments
and permission-role assignments based on the context. There-
fore, it only discussed the management in server side and
without any management about how to control the object
accessed by users. By contrast, our work provides a rich
variety of options that can deal with objects in both server
and user sides. Second, role-based access control was used
in DRBAC which must be combined with feasible authen-
tication mechanisms to secure pervasive applications in the
real world. In our scheme, a security architecture has been
designed to support the authorization processes such as pre-
Authorizations, pre-Obligations and pre-Conditions as well
as ongoing-Authorizations, ongoing-Obligations, and ongoing-
Conditions.
Role-based access control in ambient and remote space
was described by H. Wedde and M. Lischka in 2004 [12].
Their work was based on a distributed and layered RBAC
approach that allows at the same time for 1) more efficient
evaluation,2) avoiding evaluation circles, due to the layered
trust level and access rules, and 3) more flexibility and more
efficient administration. This paper restricts itself to presenting
a distributed and location- dependent RBAC approach which
is multilayered. The main difference between our scheme and
the work in [12] is that we focus on a systematic level for
objects in pervasive computing by using usage control model
and consider a solution for different kinds of authorizations,
whereas the latter is a discussion of providing a secure infras-
tructure with efficient evaluation and negotiation to objects.
G. Sampemane, P. Naldurg and R. Campbell presented an
access control system that automates the creation and enforce-
ment of access control policies for different configurations of
an Active Space [5]. The Active Space is a physical space
augmented with heterogeneous computing and communication
devices along with supporting software infrastructure. The
system explicitly recognizes different modes of cooperation
between groups of users, and the dependence between physical
and virtual aspects of security in Active Spaces. The access
model in the system provides support for both discretionary
and mandatory access control policies, and uses role-based
access control techniques for easy administration of users and
permissions. However, our work substantially differs from that
access control system. Differences arise in the following three
aspects. First, their system is based on role based access
control (RBAC) and hence it focuses on permissions-role
assignment, objects hierarchies and constrains. By comparison,
based on usage control, we have analyzed the characteristics
of various access authorizations and presented detailed models
for different kinds of authorizations. Second, the approach
addresses the problems of Active Spaces in the server side. It
does not discuss a secure architecture for objects . By contrast,
we have discussed a security architecture for access control
by considering both server and client sides. Finally, their
approach is based on RBAC, and hence does not mention how
to update users’ permissions on objects when their conditions
or obligations have changed. It is an important state for objects
in an Active Space since users always alter their conditions
or obligations. By contrast, users in our scheme have to
pass pre-Authorizations and ongoing-Authorizations as well
as pre-Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-Obligations
and ongoing-Conditions. It means our approach is much more
powerful in dynamic environment.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has discussed access models and architectures
for pervasive computing by using usage control. We have
analysed not only decision factors in usage control such
as authorizations, obligations and conditions, but also the
continuity. Different kinds of models are built for ubiquitous
computing. To protect objects from malicious delegation and
dissemination in collaborative and distributed management,
we have analysed reference monitors on both server and
client sides and obtained several secure architecture solutions.
The work in this paper has significantly extended previous
work in several aspects, for example, the ongoing continuity
for authorizations, obligations and conditions. These methods
can be used to control objects in a dynamic environment
since they provide a robust access control for ubiquitous
computing environments and can protect sensitive messages
from dissemination. It also begins a new application with
usage control.
The future work includes develop algorithms based on the
models and architectures proposed in this paper and applica-
tion of the algorithms in real implementation.
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